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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The accounting literature defines real earnings management (REM) as 
management actions that deviate from normal business practices, with the primary 
objective to increase current reported earnings (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). Therefore, REM impacts current firm performance. The goal of 
this study is to understand the impact of REM on future firm performance. On the one 
hand, REM may negatively relate to future firm performance if managers are using 
REM to disguise lower firm value associated with poor current performance (i.e., 
opportunistic behavior). If REM occurs solely to meet earnings targets, then such 
actions may not represent optimal firm operations, therefore destroying the long-term 
value of the firm. On the other hand, REM may relate positively to future firm 
performance if managers use REM to (a) operate the firm more efficiently or (b) signal 
higher future firm value. This study investigates whether REM is positive or negatively 
related to future firm performance. 
This study also examines whether the relation between REM and future firm 
performance may vary cross-sectionally with managerial ability. More able managers 
are expected to operate their firms more efficiently. To the extent more able managers 
are willing to take real actions to meet earnings targets, such activities are more likely to 
be in shareholders’ best interest. Thus, managerial ability is expected to increase the 
relation between REM and future performance.  
While the extant literature examines the ex-ante determinants of REM, the 
literature provides very limited evidence on the ex-post impact of REM on future firm 
performance. Managers’ opportunistic theory suggests that REM is negatively related to 
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future firm performance while efficiency theory and signaling theory implies the 
opposite prediction. Consistent with the conflicting theoretical arguments, empirical 
evidence on the ex-post impact of REM is also mixed. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
provide evidence on the adverse effect of REM in the seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
setting. They find that post-SEO operating underperformance is driven not only by 
accrual reversals, but also by the real consequences of REM. In addition, Eldenburg, 
Gunny, Hee and Soderstrom (2011) investigate REM in the non-profit hospital setting 
and they provide weak evidence to support REM as opportunistic behavior instead of 
strategic management. In contrast, Gunny (2010) shows that firms engage in REM not 
opportunistically but use REM either to signal firms’ better future performance or to 
have more efficient operations. Specifically, she finds that firms engaging in REM to 
just meet earnings benchmarks have relatively better subsequent performance than do 
firms that do not engage in REM and miss or just meet the earnings benchmarks. Her 
findings suggest that REM is a signaling or efficient behavior rather than managerial 
opportunistic behavior. 
Given the mixed findings in the prior literature, I test the association between 
REM and future firm performance in a general setting. To capture REM, I follow 
Roychowdhury (2006) and estimate abnormal levels of production costs and 
discretionary expense (the sum of SG&A, R&D, and advertising). In addition, I 
combine these two measures into one comprehensive aggregate measure of REM. I find 
that, after controlling for size, performance, growth, and industry, the aggregate REM is 
negatively related to future firm performance. This result suggests that firms engage in 
REM opportunistically. Because more able managers are assumed to work more in the 
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interest of shareholders and make better decisions, I predict and find that managerial 
ability decreases the negative relation between REM and future firm performance. This 
indicates that more able managers minimize the negative effects of REM. 
Compared to prior studies, my study contributes to the REM literature by 
providing a more complete picture of the impact of REM on firms’ future performance. 
First, prior studies (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010) only examine the average 
difference of firm future performance between the REM firms and non-REM firms. My 
study is the first to examine whether the effect of REM on future firm performance 
varies cross-sectionally. My study first predicts that managerial ability leads to cross-
sectional variation in the impact of REM. According to Demerjian, Lev and McVay 
(2011), “more able managers can better understand technology and industry trends, 
reliably predict product demand, invest in higher value projects and manage their 
employees more efficiently than less able managers” (p.1). Therefore, I expect more 
able managers to generate more value enhancing effect of REM (or minimize value 
destroying effect). By including managerial ability, this study suggests that the impact 
of REM may vary predictably as a function of managerial ability.  
Second, my study investigates the impact of REM on future firm performance 
by using a sample of firms that are more likely to have managed earnings to meet/beat 
various earnings targets. The findings in this study do not depend on a specific 
corporate event (such as SEOs, as in Cohen and Zarowin 2010), or a specific industry 
(such as non-profit hospitals, as in Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee and Soderstrom 2011), or a 
specific time period (such as pre-SOX period, as in Gunny 2010). My study contributes 
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to the literature by providing evidence on the signaling/efficiency-versus-opportunistic 
debate. 
Third, this study directly answers the call for research on the impact of earnings 
management by Healy and Wahlen (1999). My study extends this line of research by 
investigating the impact of REM on future firm performance. Additionally, this study 
also answers the call for research on how managers choose competing objectives by 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010). These objectives could relate to compensation, 
litigation risk, proprietary costs, incentives to influence stock price, or long-term 
performance. My study directly investigates whether managers trade off immediate 
benefits of opportunistic accounting choices against the potential long-term reputation 
loss (opportunism) or trade off short-term sacrifice of economic value against the long-
term benefits (signaling). 
Finally, my study has important implications for managers and investors. For 
managers, it is important to understand the long-term impact of REM that they may 
want to engage in. It is also important for investors to know that whether REM achieves 
short-term goals while sacrificing long-term benefits. If this is the case, investors may 
want to invest carefully when they see possible REM in their long-term investment 
firms. 
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Chapter 2: Background and Hypotheses Development 
In the following section, I review prior research related to earnings management. 
I also summarize the literature on the existence of REM. In addition, I examine existing 
papers on the impact of REM. I rely on economic theory and earnings management 
literature to develop my hypothesis. 
2.1 Earnings Management Literature 
The earnings management literature attempts to help people understand why 
managers manage earnings, how they do so and the consequences of this behavior.  
Extant empirical evidence shows that managers face significant pressure to 
avoid reporting losses, earnings declines and negative earnings surprises (Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; 
Payne and Thomas, 2003; Gore, Pope and Singh, 2007). One possibility of why 
managers place such weight on achieving these earnings thresholds is stakeholders’ 
reliance on heuristic cutoffs, such as zero earnings, to assess managerial and firm 
performance (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Prior research shows that the market 
rewards firms that meet or beat earnings benchmarks (Barth, Elliott and Finn, 1999; 
Bartov, Givdy and Hayn, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols; 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 
2002; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Rees and Sivaramakrishnan 2007), and penalizes firms 
when earnings benchmarks are missed (Bernard, Thomas and Abarbanell, 1993; 
Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Payne and Thomas, 2010). Given the importance of these 
earnings benchmarks, it is not surprising that managers may manage earnings upward to 
attain these earnings targets.  
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Managers can respond to the possibility of missing a benchmark in at least three 
ways. First, managers may manage earnings opportunistically to maximize firm 
valuations, avoid contracting consequences such as violation of debt covenants (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999; Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Aboody 
and Kasznik, 2000; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Second, if managers have private 
information that future profitability will be high, managers may manage earnings to 
signal managers’ private information (Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond and Park, 1997; 
Altamuro, Beatty and Weber, 2005; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; Hope, Dou and 
Thomas, 2011). Third, managers may cut back on unnecessary expenditures in tough 
times; the cuts may result in the company meeting or beating its current year 
benchmarks, but management did not intentionally signal. 
Prior research shows that managers primarily employ three strategies to manage 
earnings to attain earnings targets. One way earnings can be managed is by 
manipulating accruals which does not affect cash flows (see Schipper, 1989; Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; for literature review). The accrual earnings 
management is achieved by changing accounting methods or estimates used when 
reporting a given transaction in the financial statement. Examples include changing the 
depreciation method for fixed assets and altering the estimates for provision for 
doubtful accounts. In sum, this earnings management strategy can bias reported 
earnings in a particular direction without direct cash flow consequences.  
Another way earnings could be managed is through classification shifting 
(McVay, 2006; Fan, Barua, Cready and Thomas, 2010). In the case of classification 
shifting, managers reclassify core expenses as special items to improve reported core 
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earnings. A third channel through which earnings can be managed to attain the target is 
structuring real transactions which affect both earnings and cash flows. The real activity 
manipulation is a purposeful activity to move reported earnings in a particular direction, 
which can be achieved by changing the timing of an activity or structuring an operation. 
This earnings management strategy has to take place during the fiscal year. For 
example, managers may engage in price discounts to increase sales, overproduction to 
spread fixed costs over more units and thus reduce COGS, or reduction of discretionary 
expenses (e.g. R&D expenses, advertising expenses, employee training expenses) to 
avoid missing earnings targets (Baber, Fairfield and Haggard, 1991; Dechow and Sloan, 
1991; Bushee, 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008).  
 Studies on the consequences of earnings management have focused primarily on 
stock price effects. Prior research shows how ex-ante earnings management relates to 
observed post event abnormal stock returns. Some evidence shows that investors see 
through earnings management (Shivakumar, 2000; Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh and Zhang, 
2004). Stock return evidence also indicates that investors discount abnormal accruals 
relative to normal accruals. However, several other studies suggest that the market 
overprices the portion of abnormal accruals stemming from managerial discretion 
(Sloan, 1996; Teoh, Wong and Rao, 1998; Xie, 2001; Cheng and Thomas, 2006).  
2.2 Evidence of Real Earnings Management 
In a survey of company executives, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) show 
that financial executives indicate a stronger willingness to manage earnings through real 
activities than through accruals. There are at least two reasons for this choice. First, 
accrual earnings management is more likely to call attention from auditors and 
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regulators than real activity earnings management. Second, accrual manipulation has 
constraints. Because of the reversing nature of accrual accounting, managers’ optimistic 
accounting choices in one period reduce their ability to make similar optimistic choices 
in subsequent periods. Therefore, the realized shortfall between unmanaged earnings 
and desired earnings targets can exceed the amount by which accruals can be managed. 
That is, if all accrual earnings management strategies are used and the reported earnings 
still falls short of the desired thresholds, managers then have no options because REM 
cannot be adjusted after the fiscal year end. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) 
further show the prevalence of real activities manipulation as an earnings management 
tool by specifically reporting that: 
“A surprising 78% of the surveyed executives would give up economic value in 
exchange for smooth earnings.” (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005, p.5) 
 
“…strong evidence that managers take real economic actions to maintain 
accounting appearances. In particular, 80% of survey participants report that they would 
decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an 
earnings target. More than half (55.3%) state that they would delay starting a new 
project to meet an earnings target, even if such a delay entailed a small sacrifice in 
value…” (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005, p.32-33) 
This survey study provides support to the idea that firms engage in REM. 
However, it is still unclear whether managers engage in REM due to efficiency 
consideration, or to signal better future performance, or this is just a type of their 
opportunistic behavior.  
In addition to the survey evidence, extant empirical evidence confirms the 
existence of REM. Much earlier evidence centers on managerial discretion over R&D 
expenditures (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Baber, Fairfield and Haggard, 1991; Bushee, 
1998; Cheng, 2004). Later studies suggest that managers engage in a variety of REM 
activities in addition to R&D reduction. Other types of REM activities manipulation 
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that have been investigated in the prior research include overproduction (Lev and 
Thiagarajan, 1993; Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010), 
stock repurchases (Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong, 2003), sale of assets (Bartov, 1993; 
Herrmann, Inoue and Thomas, 2003), cutting advertising expenditures (Roychowdhury, 
2006; Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi and McInnis, 2009; Gunny, 2010), cutting selling, 
general and administrative expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010), and sales 
price reduction (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010). 
Consistent with the survey evidence in Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005), 
prior empirical evidence also shows that managers use accrual earnings management 
and REM as substitutes. Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) find that managers switched from 
using more accruals to using more REM after the passage of SOX in 2002. A 
subsequent study by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) investigates the accrual earnings 
management and REM around SEO. They find that these SEO firms use both forms of 
earnings management in the year of SEO and that the tendency for SEO firms to use 
REM is positively correlated with the costs of accrual earnings management in these 
firms. Zang (2012) finds that managers trade off the two forms of earnings management 
based on their relative costs. She further suggests that managers adjust the level of 
accrual earnings management according to the level of REM. In sum, these three studies 
together suggest that managers use REM and accrual earnings management as 
substitutes. 
2.3 Impact of REM on Future Operating Performance 
While there is prevalent survey and empirical evidence showing the existence of 
REM, evidence on the impact of this earnings management form is limited. Three 
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recent studies test the consequence of real earnings management on firms’ future 
operating performance. However, these three studies provide mixed results regarding to 
the impact of REM.  
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) investigate the relation between earnings 
management behavior of SEO firms and post-SEO operating underperformance. They 
document that SEO firms engage in REM in addition to accrual earnings management. 
Furthermore, they show that the decline in post-SEO performance due to the real 
activities manipulation is more severe than that due to accrual management. Overall, 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show an adverse ex-post effect of REM for a specific 
corporate event, SEO. Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee and Soderstrom (2011) investigate REM 
in nonprofit hospitals. They conclude that “we find weak evidence to support 
opportunism rather than good management” (p. 1605). While the nonprofit hospital 
setting provides weak evidence showing the negative effect of real activities 
manipulation on future performance, it is important to examine whether this is true for 
publicly traded firms.   
On the other hand, Gunny (2010) uses a sample of public traded firms from 
1988 to 2002 to examine the relation between REM and future operating performance. 
She specifically focuses on a sample of firms that have high incentives to manage 
earnings to achieve earnings benchmarks (meet/beat zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings). She finds that firms that engage in REM have relatively better subsequent 
three years performance than firms that do not engage in REM and miss or just meet the 
benchmarks. Gunny (2010) suggests that firms’ engagement in REM pre-SOX is 
consistent with signaling rather than opportunism. My study complements hers in that I 
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investigate the ex-post effect of REM on firms’ operating performance for pre-SOX and 
post-SOX periods (as suggested by Cohen, Dey and Lys 2008 that managers switching 
from accrual management to REM after the passage of SOX in 2002) and test whether 
this effect could be a function of managerial ability or the need to signal. 
In sum, the recent trend in examining REM focuses primarily on the ex-ante 
existence of REM. Limited evidence is provided for the ex-post effect of REM. 
Consistent with the conflicting theoretical arguments, the empirical evidence on the ex-
post effect is also mixed. Therefore, the directional relation between REM and firms’ 
future operating performance is still an empirical question. My study will add additional 
evidence to this line of literature. 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
The Impact of REM on Future Performance 
As discussed above, prior accounting literature has investigated the impact of 
REM on future firm performance for some specific contexts and provides mixed 
findings. Unlike prior research, however, I examine the impact of REM in a general 
setting, which doesn’t depend on a specific corporate event, a specific sample or a 
specific time period. As discussed below, there are competing explanations for the 
impact of REM on future firm performance. Under managers’ opportunistic behavior, 
the relation between REM and future firm performance is negative, while under 
efficiency and signaling behavior the predicted relation is positive.  
Managers’ Opportunistic Behavior Prediction 
 Economic theory provides a theoretical basis for opportunistic behavior that 
managers’ concern over current performance motivates them to manipulate current-
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period earnings at the expense of future-period earnings (Stein, 1989; Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1995). One reason for managers’ opportunistic behavior is that outside investors 
and analysts rely on current-period earnings to make forecast of future earnings. 
Another reason for this behavior is that most contractual obligations (such as earnings 
based bonuses, debt contracts, etc.) are linked to current-period earnings. Knowing this 
fact, managers will attempt to manipulate today’s earnings to raise forecast firm value.  
 Empirical research on the practice of managers’ opportunistic behavior includes 
DeAngelo (1986), Perry and Williams (1994), Dechow and Sloan (1991), Jacobson and 
Aaker (1993), and Aboody and Kasznik (2000). DeAngelo (1986) examines the 
accounting decisions made by managers of management buyouts of public stockholders. 
She hypothesizes that managers of buyout firms have an incentive to “understate” 
earnings through accrual earnings management. However, she finds little evidence of 
earnings management through accruals by buyout firms. Related to DeAngelo (1986), 
Perry and Williams (1994) examine unexpected accruals controlling for changes in 
revenue and depreciable capital. Their findings indicate that managers engage in 
income-decreasing earnings management prior to management buyout. 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) examine CEOs’ opportunistic behavior in their final 
years of office. They find that these CEOs manage discretionary investment 
expenditures to improve short-term earnings performance. In particular, these CEOs 
spend less on R&D during their final years in office. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
examine the timing of voluntary disclosures around CEO stock option awards. They 
find that managers manage earnings downward around award dates by delaying good 
news and rushing forward bad news. Their findings suggest that CEOs make 
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opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option 
compensation. In summary, prior research provides evidence on the existence of 
management opportunistic behavior in an array of business contexts, such as earnings 
management through accruals prior to management buyout, discretionary investment 
expenditures in management final year in the office, and voluntary disclosure decision 
around CEO stock option awards. 
Empirical research has also examined the consequence of managers’ 
opportunistic behavior, such as Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998), Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi 
and McInnis (2009), and Cohen and Zarowin (2010). Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) 
provide evidence that managers overstate earnings through accrual management prior to 
initial public offerings (IPOs). They show that this opportunistic management behavior 
results in negative consequence in the stock market in the long-run. A related study, 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find that post-SEO operating underperformance is due to 
management opportunistic behavior through earnings management prior to SEOs. 
Furthermore, they report that post-SEO operating underperformance is driven not just 
by accrual reversals, but also due to the real consequence of earnings management 
through real transactions.   
Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi and McInnis (2009) investigate the market performance 
consequences of management opportunistic behavior, especially by cutting 
discretionary expenditures and managing accruals to exceed analyst forecasts. They find 
that firms just beat analyst forecasts through this kind of opportunistic behavior has a 
short-term stock price benefit relative to firms that miss forecasts without doing so. 
However, this trend reverses over a 3-year horizon. Overall, this study provides 
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evidence on the negative consequence of management opportunistic behavior to beat 
earnings benchmarks.  
In summary, early research suggests that managers engage in array of 
opportunistic behavior that concerns short-term benefits detrimental to long-term firm 
value. The firms that have managers engaging in opportunistic behavior experience 
poor stock return performance and operating performance in the long run. I expect that 
managers could engage in earnings management through real transactions for the short-
term benefit only. This line of research tends to the prediction that REM is negatively 
related to future operating performance. Managers’  
Efficient Behavior Prediction 
 As indicated in the prior section, managers’ opportunistic behavior suggests that 
managers may engage in REM opportunistically, therefore result in a negative relation 
between REM and future firm performance. In this section and the next section, I 
discuss a positive relation between REM and future firm performance that is consistent 
with two distinct explanations: efficiency and signaling. In this section, I argue that 
managers’ efficient behavior suggest a positive relation between REM and future firm 
performance. 
 Under opportunistic prediction, REM is supposed to be actions taken that 
deviate from optimal business strategy and is hence less efficient operations. In other 
words, REM is assumed to be costly to firms. In this section, I discuss an alternative 
and contrasting possible role of REM. Specifically, I argue that REM could be actions 
that are taken to achieve earnings targets that help the firm to operate more efficiently. 
These actions are dictated by managers’ strategic consideration and assist the firm to 
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switch to an updated optimal business strategy. Therefore, REM may not only have 
positive effect on current firm performance but also enhance long-term performance. 
This strategic consideration scenario, an idea considered in strategic management 
literature, leads to the prediction that REM is positively associated with future operating 
performance. 
 Strategic management deals with utilization of firm resources to enhance firm 
performance in their external environments. Lamb (1984) defines strategic management 
as below:  
“an ongoing process that evaluates and controls the business and the industries 
in which the company is involved; assesses its competitors and sets goals and strategies 
to meet all existing and potential competitors; and then reassesses each strategy 
annually or quarterly to determine how it has been implemented and whether it 
has succeeded or needs replacement by a new strategy to meet changed 
circumstances, new technology, new competitors, a new economic environment, or 
a new social, financial or political environment.” (Lamb, 1984, ix, emphasis added) 
 Consistent with Lamb (1984), managers may engage in REM due to their 
strategic management consideration. In managers’ regularly (annually or quarterly) 
business strategy reassessment, they realize the need of updating their strategy due to 
the change in the external environment. Therefore, they take actions (REM) to shift 
their business to an updated optimal business strategy. If this is the case, REM is not 
costly to the firm, but enhances firm operation efficiency. Thus, under this scenario, 
REM is positively related to future operating performance. 
Managers Signaling Behavior Prediction 
 As discussed in the prior section, the efficiency explanation suggests a positive 
relation between REM and future firm performance. In this section, I discuss an 
alternative possible explanation for this positive relation. Specifically, I argue 
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managers’ signaling behavior may be another rationale that explains the positive 
relation between REM and future firm performance. 
In markets with asymmetric information when one party has more or better 
information than another party, transactions are less likely to occur (Akerlof, 1970). 
One possible solution to this problem is signaling (Spence, 1973). One party sends a 
signal that reveals some piece of relevant information to another party. Spence first 
proposes this solution in a job market scenario where employees attempt to sell their 
services to employers for some price. In general, employers are willing to pay a higher 
price for a better employee. However, while employees may know their own ability 
level, the employers cannot observe this ability level, thus there is an information 
asymmetry between employers and employees. In this case, education credentials can 
be used as a signal by employees to indicate their ability level, therefore narrowing the 
information gap between employers and employees. The costs associated with attaining 
education credentials are referred as signaling costs.  
 Signaling works effectively in a situation of asymmetric information only if it 
satisfies the following two requirements. First, the signal is observable and is positively 
related to the unseen characteristics that are valuable to the less informed party. Second, 
the signaling costs are negatively related to the productive capability. In Spence’s job 
market signaling model, education credentials becomes signal only when (a) the 
employer assumes that these credentials are positively correlated with employees’ 
greater ability and (b) the costs of obtaining the credentials are lower for the high 
quality employees. In addition, the signaling costs have to be less than the potential 
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benefits of engaging in signaling activity. In sum, signaling costs play a significant role 
in this model.  
 Since the proposition of job market signaling model by Spence in 1973, the 
signaling theory has been applied in the field of finance and accounting research 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977; Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond and Park, 1997; Altamuro, 
Beatty and Weber, 2003; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; Dou, Hope and Thomas, 2011). 
One finance study, Leland and Pyle (1977) show how companies with good future 
perspectives and higher possibilities of success (good companies) should send a clear 
signal to the market when going public. One such signal could be entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to retain shares in their own firms.  
Since accounting involves the transfer of managers’ private information to those 
who need it for decision-making, signaling theory has also been widely applied to 
accounting research (Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond and Park, 1997; Altamuro, Beatty 
and Weber, 2003; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; Dou, Hope and Thomas, 2011). DeFond 
and Park (1997) suggest that income smoothing is not used opportunistically, but 
improves the ability of income to reflect future performance. Related to DeFond and 
Park’ (1997) conjecture that discretionary accruals are used to smooth income, Tucker 
and Zarowin (2006) provide additional evidence on the informativeness of income 
smoothing. In addition, related to the debate on the information-versus-garbling role of 
income smoothing, Dou, Hope and Thomas (2011) provide more evidence on the 
efficiency side of income smoothing. Overall, these studies indicate that income 
smoothing is used as a vehicle for managers to signal their private information about 
future performance.  
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The economic literature suggests that signaling is used in markets with 
asymmetric information to make the transaction happen. Additionally, finance and 
accounting literature suggest that managers rely on signals, such as smoother earnings, 
to transfer their private information to the outside parties. These research streams 
together suggest that managers use discretion in their financial reporting and operating 
decisions to signal their private information about firms’ future performance to 
uninformed outside parties. Using this signaling framework, I expect that only firms 
with good future prospects engage in REM to signal future performance because this 
signaling option could be too costly for poorly performing firms to follow. Overall, the 
benefits of signaling outweigh the signaling costs. This reasoning lends to the prediction 
that REM is positively associated with future operating performance. 
In summary, misalignment of managers’ and shareholders’ incentives could 
induce managers to use REM to manage earnings opportunistically, thereby resulting in 
a negative relation between REM and future firm performance. On the other hand, 
managerial discretion on the operating transactions could enhance earnings 
informativeness by allowing transfer of private information, or REM could be purely 
dictated by managers’ efficiency consideration. These two arguments together predict a 
positive relation between REM and future firm performance.  
Given that existing theories provide competing predictions about the effect of 
REM on future operating performance, I test the following alternative hypotheses: 
H1: REM affects future firm performance. 
[Insert Figure 1, 2 and 3] 
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Managerial Ability and the Impact of REM 
In this section, I attempt to isolate the efficiency argument using managerial 
ability. Specifically, I argue that managers’ ability to efficiently operate his/her firm 
helps explain the cross-sectional variation in the impact of REM. The neoclassical view 
of the firm considers top managers to be homogeneous inputs into the production 
process. In other words, faced with similar technologies, factors, and product market 
conditions, different managers would make similar choices. This view implies that 
managers do not matter for corporate practices (Weintraub, 2002). In contrast, upper 
echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007) states that 
organizational outcomes (e.g., strategic choices and performance levels) are partially 
influenced by managerial background characteristics. Numerous studies have since 
found evidence documenting the correlation between managers and corporate decisions. 
For example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that CEOs have different managerial 
styles that are carried as they go from one firm to another firm, and more importantly, 
these different styles matter for a wide range of corporate decisions. Examples of these 
decisions are acquisition or diversification decisions, dividend policy, and cost cutting 
policy. Several other studies find the relation between CFO expertise and restatements 
(Aier, Comprix, Gunlock, and Lee, 2005), CEO reputation and earnings quality 
(Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, and Zhang, 2008), managerial style and firm voluntary 
disclosure (Bamber, Jiang, and Wang, 2010), managerial style and corporate tax 
avoidance (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010), and CFOs’ style and accounting 
policies (Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang, 2011). Taken together, the evidence in this line of 
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research lends support to the important role of individual managers in certain corporate 
decisions and performance. In other words, top managers matter for corporate practice. 
After recognizing managers as a potential source of value creation for the firm, 
recent strategic management literature documents that managerial ability affects 
resource productivity (Holcomb, Holmes, and Connelly, 2009). In particular, firm 
performance depends on the ability of managers to create value from resources the firm 
controls. From a strategic perspective, managerial ability derives from two main 
sources: domain expertise and resource expertise.  
“Domain expertise refers to managers’ understanding of the industry context 
and the firm’s strategies, products, markets, task environments, and routines, while 
resource expertise refers to the ability of managers to select and configure a firm’s 
resource portfolio, bundle resources into distinctive combinations, and deploy them to 
exploit opportunities in specific contexts.”  (Holcomb, Holmes, and Connelly, 2009, p. 
459, emphasis added) 
Recent studies have found compelling evidence of managerial ability in the 
finance and accounting literature. For example, Litov, Baker, Wachter, and Wurgler 
(2005) suggest that managerial ability plays an important role in explaining investment 
company behavior. Berk and Green (2004) and Berk and Stanton (2007) find that 
managerial ability explains much of the observed behavior of open-end and close-end 
fund. 
Several other studies examine the relation between managerial ability and 
accounting practices. Hayes and Schaefer (1999) find a relation between managerial 
ability and abnormal returns. They identify more able managers as those who resign for 
a similar position at another firm, and find that firms losing these more able managers 
experience a negative stock price reaction of -1.51%. Baik, Farber, and Lee (2011) find 
a positive relation between CEO ability and both the likelihood and frequency of 
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management earnings forecasts. Demerjian, Lewis, Lev, and McVay (2011) examine 
whether managerial ability is associated with earnings quality. They find that more able 
managers are associated with fewer subsequent restatements, higher earnings and 
accruals persistence, lower errors in the bad debt provision, and higher quality accrual 
estimations. Taken together, the findings in this line of research suggest that managerial 
ability does have an influence on firm performance and accounting practices. 
Managerial ability is likely to affect firm performance. More able managers 
have more knowledge about their business, therefore making better judgments and 
decisions. I expect more able managers to be more knowledgeable about their own firm 
and the industry they are in, as well as to be better able to see how decisions and 
choices affect the long-term value and the overall effectiveness of the organization. 
Given the estimation challenges to form a forward-looking operational plan involved in 
REM, as well as the complexities in the consideration of the short-term versus the long-
term benefits of REM, more able managers will make better decisions relative to lower 
ability managers in similar situations. For example, facing the same pressure of meeting 
the benchmarks, a more able manager and a lower ability manager may choose different 
transactions to manage earnings up. In other words, a more able manager may engage in 
the type of transactions that has less adverse effect, or they may even use this 
opportunity to update their business strategy to achieve more efficient business 
operations. On the other hand, a lower ability manager may not be able to see the long-
term effect of different transactions, therefore choose the transaction whichever comes 
to them handy and can help achieve current benchmarks.  
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In summary, early studies suggest that managerial ability impacts firm 
performance and accounting choices. Managerial ability is likely to affect managers’ 
choice among transactions they use to manage earnings, therefore affects future firm 
performance. I expect that more able managers are better able to choose the right 
transaction to manage earnings and the right transaction enhances future firm 
performance. Thus, more able managers generate more positive effect of REM, or 
minimize negative effect of REM. My second hypothesis is: 
H2: The relation between REM and future firm performance increases with 
managerial ability. 
In other words, to the extent REM relates positively to future firm performance, 
high managerial ability is expected to further increase the positive relation. If REM and 
future firm performance are negatively related, high managerial ability should reduce 
the negative relation. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
3.1 Variable Definitions 
REM Measures 
Following prior literature, I examine the following two methods of REM: 
reducing cost of goods sold by overproducing inventory and cutting discretionary 
expenses (R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenses). These two manipulation methods 
are investigated by two proxies: the abnormal level of production costs and the 
abnormal level of discretionary expenses. Subsequent studies using the same proxies 
provide further evidence that these proxies capture REM (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012, McGuire, Omer, and Sharp, 
2012).  
1. Reducing cost of goods sold by overproduction. Managers can produce more 
goods than demand to increase earnings. When managers produce more units, they can 
allocate the fixed overhead costs over a larger number of units, therefore lowering the 
fixed costs per unit. As long as this reduction in fixed costs per unit is not offset by the 
increase in marginal cost per unit, total cost per unit declines. This overproduction leads 
to a lower cost of goods sold, while some extra production costs and holding costs. 
Overall, overproduction results in higher production costs and lower cash flows for a 
given sales level.  
2. Reducing discretionary expenditures including R&D, advertising, and SG&A 
expenses. This reduction of discretionary expenses will lead to higher current earnings 
and possibly higher cash flows if these expenses are paid in cash.  
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 Following Roychowdhury (2006), I estimate the abnormal level of production 
costs using the following equation:  
      
           
   
 
           
   
       
           
   
        
           
   
           
           
     
(1) 
 
Production costs are defined as the sum of COGS and the change in inventory 
during the year. Equation (1) is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry and year so 
that the estimated coefficients vary over time and reflect the impact of industry-wide 
economic circumstances during the year on production costs. The industry is identified 
using two-digit SIC code.
1
 I require at least 15 observations for each industry-year. The 
abnormal level of production costs is measured as the estimated residual from equation 
(1). The higher the residual, the larger is the amount the inventory overproduction and 
the greater is the use of the reduction of COGS to increase earnings.  
 Also following Roychowdhury (2006), I estimate the abnormal level of 
discretionary expenditures with the following regression: 
      
           
   
 
           
   
          
           
     
(2) 
The abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is measured as the estimated 
residuals from the above equation. Following Zang (2012), I multiply the residual by 
negative one so that the higher the value the more likely the firm is cutting discretionary 
expenditures.  
                                                 
1 Roychowdhury (2006) showed that the results will not be impacted if using Fama and French (1997) 
industry classification.  
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 Given sales levels, firms that manage earnings through REM are likely to have 
one or both of these: abnormally high production costs, and/or abnormally low 
discretionary expenditures. To capture the total effects of REM, I test another aggregate 
REM metrics in addition to the individual two metrics following Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) and McGuire, Omer, and Sharp (2012)
2
. The aggregate metric is the aggregation 
of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures (Agg REM). The 
higher the value of the aggregate measure, the more likely the firm is engaging in REM. 
In sum, I will use two individual proxies (abnormal discretionary expenditures, and 
abnormal production costs) and one aggregate proxy (Agg REM) to test my hypotheses. 
Managerial Ability Measures 
 My conceptual variable managerial ability should capture managers’ ability to 
efficiently manage his/her firm. The measure of managerial ability in Demerjian, Lev, 
and McVay (2012) is a reasonable proxy for this construct. Their measure of managerial 
ability is a performance-based measure of managers’ efficiency in using their firms’ 
resources. More able managers will generate a higher rate of output for a given level of 
resources, or minimize resources used for a given level of output. This measure is 
intuitively appealing because it measures managerial ability in line with the over-
arching goal of the firm – maximizing profit (output) for a given level of resources. The 
other existing measures of managerial ability are media coverage (Milbourn, 2003; 
Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora, 2006; Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, and Zang, 2008), 
historical return (Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora, 2006) and managerial fixed effects 
(Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010; Ge, Matsumoto, and 
                                                 
2Cohen and Zarowin (2010) note that aggregating all three proxies into one proxy may not be 
conceptually right because the same activity (overproduction) that lead to unusually high production costs 
can also lead to unusually low cash flow from operations.  
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Zhang, 2011). The advantage of Demerjian et al. measure is that it is manager-specific 
and available for a large sample of firms, while media coverage and historical returns 
are difficult to attribute solely to manager, or manager fixed effects is limited to a small 
sample of managers who switch firms. In addition, the Demerjian et al. measure 
outperforms the other existing measures of managerial ability (Demerjian, Lev, and 
McVay, 2012). 
 Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) adopt two steps to formulate their measure 
of managerial ability. First, they use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate 
total firm efficiency (which is influenced by both the manager and the firm
3
) within its 
industry, where efficient firms are those that generate more revenue from a given set of 
resources (Cost of Goods Sold, Selling and Administrative Expenses, Net PP&E, Net 
Operating Leases, Net Research and Development, Purchased Goodwill, and Other 
Intangible Assets). They specifically solve the following optimization problem: 
maxv θ = 
     
                                                            
 
(3) 
The five stock variables (Net PP&E, Net Operating Leases, Net Research and 
Development, Purchased Goodwill, and Other Intangible Assets) are measured at the 
beginning of year t, while the two flow variables (Cost of Goods Sold and SG&A) are 
measured over year t. They estimate DEA efficiency (total firm efficiency) by industry 
group because it is reasonable that firms in the same industry have similar technologies 
and business models to convert resources to outputs. The optimization finds the firm-
                                                 
3 For example, manager can achieve higher firm efficiency if they are better able to predict future demand 
and industry trend. Or firm characteristic, such as size, can also help achieve higher firm efficiency 
because managers in large firms can negotiate better terms. 
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specific vector of optimal weights on the seven inputs, v, by comparing each of the 
input choices of the firm under study to those of the other firms in its estimation group. 
The efficiency measure (calculated in optimization model 3), θ, can take the value 
between zero and one, where one indicates the most efficiency. The score indicates the 
degree to which the firm is efficient, where the closer the score to one the more efficient 
the firm is.  
 Since the total firm efficiency score can be attributed to both the manager and 
the firm, Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) then partition total firm efficiency 
between the firm and the manager. They regress total firm efficiency on six firm-
characteristics that either aid or hinder mangement’s efforts: firm size, market share, 
positive cash flow, and firm age (these four factors likely aid management), and 
complex multi-segment and international operations (these two likely hinder 
management). They estimate the following Tobit regression by industry including year 
fixed effects. They cluster standard errors by firm and year to control for cross-sectional 
and inter-temporal correlation: 
Firm Efficiency = β0 +β1Ln(Total Assets) +β2Market Share +β3Positive Free 
Cash Flow +β4Ln(Age) +β5BusinessSegmentConcentration +β6Foreign 
Currency Indicator +Year Indicators + є 
(4) 
 The residual from this regression is the measure of managerial ability that I am 
going to use in my study. I will adopt this measure of managerial ability in two ways. 
First, I directly incorporate the residual (continuous variable) of model (4) as the 
measure of managerial ability in my test. Second, following Demerjian, Lewis, Lev, and 
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McVay (2011), I decile rank the residual by year and industry to make it more 
comparable across time and industries and to mitigate the extreme observations. 
 To check the validity of their measure, Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) find 
that this measure is strongly associated with manager fixed effects and CEO pay. Taken 
together, their validity tests support that their measure of managerial ability is a 
manager-specific measure.  
3.2 Testing H1 
H1 predicts that REM relates to future firm performance, but the sign of the 
relation depends on whether managers primarily engage in REM for opportunistic 
versus efficiency/signaling reasons. That is, when managers engage in REM to manage 
earnings opportunistically, REM is predicted to be negatively related to future firm 
performance; when managers engage in REM to signal higher future performance or to 
increase operating efficiency, REM is predicted to be positively related to future firm 
performance. To test this hypothesis, I examine the relation between REM engagement 
to barely meet benchmarks in period t and future firm performance in period t+1, t+2, 
and t+3. I estimate the following equation: 
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
where the dependent variable is future firm performance, proxed by adjROAt+i.  
adjROAt+I is defined as the difference between firm-specific future ROA and the 
median ROA for the same year and industry. Subscript t refers to the year on which 
REM is engaged to barely meet the benchmarks while subscript i  refers to the number 
of year after period t. Suspect is an indicator variable, which equals one if a firm is 
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identified as REM suspect (refer to an earlier section on “REM Suspect Firms 
Identification”), and zero otherwise.  
 Control variables are included following Gunny (2010), which include adjROAt  
to control for current performance, SIZE to control for size effect, MTB to control for 
growth opportunities, and ZSCORE to control for the financial health of the firm.  
 I expect a negative relation between firm future performance and suspects 
(β1<0) if managers are primarily opportunistic, and a positive relation (β1>0) if most 
managers are using REM for efficiency or signaling reasons.  
3.3 Testing H2 
H2 predicts that managerial ability either mitigates the negative effect of REM 
on future performance or enhances the positive effect of REM on future performance. In 
other words, more able managers either strengthen the positive relation or weaken the 
negative relation between the suspect variable and future firm performance. To test this 
hypothesis, I modify Model 5 by adding an interaction variable for managerial ability. 
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + 
β3*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
(6) 
Managerial ability measure is calculated following Demerijian, Lev, and McVay (2012) 
as discussed above. I use managerial ability from period t-1 assuming managerial ability 
is not changing from period t-1 to period t.
4
 Control variables are the same as those used 
in Model 5. 
 β3 is the variable of interest to test my H2. I predict a positive relation between 
managerial ability and future firm performance of REM firms (β3>0). This prediction 
                                                 
4 This is actually the underlying implication in Demerjian, Lev, and McVay’s measure of managerial 
ability. Their measure captures the managerial ability of a management team instead of any individual 
ability. So it is less likely to change with the departure of any individual of the management team. 
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supports that managerial ability either strengthens the positive effect of REM or 
weakens the negative effect of REM. 
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Chapter 4: Data, Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
I obtain data from the 2011 Annual Compustat File for financial statement data. 
The sample selection process is detailed in Table 2. My sample starts from all firm-
years from 1987 to 2008 with the required data to calculate the REM measures and the 
managerial ability measure. The sample period begins with 1987 because I require that 
cash flow from operations be available from the Statement of Cash Flow in Compustat. 
The period ends in 2008 since the measure of future firm performance requires three 
years of subsequent earnings. I exclude financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and 
regulated companies (SIC 4400-5000) from the sample because firms in highly 
regulated industries follow accounting rules that differ from other industries. Because 
the equations for production costs and discretionary expenditures are estimated by every 
industry-year, I require at least 15 observations for every industry-year. Imposing all the 
data-availability requirements yields a final sample of 82,839 firm-years over the period 
1987 – 2008, including 40 industries, 830 industry-years and 10,043 individual firms.  
 Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables in the final sample 
that are used to test my two hypotheses. The definitions of the variables can be found in 
Table 1. The mean (median) of managerial ability is −0.0370 (−0.0434), which is 
comparable to this reported in Demerjian et al. (2012). The mean (median) of the 
residual of the estimated production costs model is −0.4969 (−0.5278). The mean 
(median) of the residual of the estimated discretionary expense model is 0.1210 
(0.2265). The aggregate residual which measures the total level of REM has a mean 
(median) of −0.3759 (−0.2583). All of these means and medians are comparable to prior 
studies (e.g., Zang 2012). The estimated residuals from the estimation models measure 
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the abnormal level of production costs and discretionary expense. Higher levels of 
abnormal production costs and discretionary expense indicate more REM through sales 
manipulation, overproduction and cutting discretionary expenses. I winsorize all my 
variables at the top and bottom 1 percent to avoid the influence of outliers.  
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation among the variables. The high 
correlations between Production REM and Aggregate REM, and between Discretionary 
REM and Aggregate REM are mechanical because Aggregate REM is the sum of these 
two proxies. There is a negative correlation between Production REM and Discretionary 
REM. The negative correlation between managerial ability and aggregate REM 
suggests that better managers are negatively correlated with REM overall. And the 
positive correlations between managerial ability and future performance measures 
(adjROAt+1, adjROAt+2, and adjROAt+3) suggest that better managers are positively 
correlated with future performance. 
Table 5 reports the estimation results for the normal levels of production costs 
and discretionary expense (Model 1 and 2). These two models are estimated cross-
sectionally for every industry-year with at least 15 observations. There are 830 industry-
years available during the sample period. The table reports the mean coefficients across 
industry-years. The t-statistics are calculated using the standard error of the mean 
coefficients across industry-years (Fama and MacBeth 1973). The coefficients are 
generally significant and as predicted which are comparable to those reported in 
Roychowdhury (2006). The reported adjusted    are means across industry-years. The 
mean adjusted    is 79.30 percent for the production costs model and 14.06 percent for 
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the discretionary expense model, indicating that these models have reasonable 
prediction power.  
Table 6 reports the results for the managerial ability estimation model. The table 
reports the mean coefficients estimated across the 43 industry estimation. The t-
statistics are calculated using the standard error of the mean coefficients across 
industries along the lines of Fama and MacBeth 1973. The coefficients are generally 
significant with predicted signs except firm age and foreign currency indicator. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
5.1 Test H1 
Table 7 reports results from testing H1. H1 posits that REM affects future firm 
performance. Panel A shows results for testing the subsequent period (period t+1) 
performance for all three measures of REM and Panel B shows results for testing period 
t+1, t+2, and t+3 performance for aggregate REM. Panel A reports a significant 
negative coefficient on Production Suspect, indicating that firms that engage in 
production REM have worse subsequent performance in t+1 than the non-production 
REM firms. Controlling for current performance and other common firm characteristics, 
production REM firms have lower adjusted ROA of 1.3% than non-production REM 
firms in the subsequent year. This result suggests that firms use overproduction 
opportunistically. On the other hand, I find a significant positive relation between 
discretionary expense REM and adjusted ROA in the following period. I find that the 
average performance of discretionary expense REM is 0.26% higher than non-
discretionary expense firms. This finding suggests that managers cut discretionary 
expenses efficiently or for a good reason, which results a higher future firm 
performance compared to non-discretionary expense REM firms. Overall, I find that 
aggregate REM firms have worse future firm performance than non-REM firms. The 
average performance of aggregate REM firms is 0.4% lower than non-REM firms in the 
subsequent year. This result suggests that firms generally engage in REM 
opportunistically. The coefficients on control variables are generally significant with 
predicted sign. As predicted, current-period industry-adjusted ROA, firm size, growth 
and financial health are positive associated with industry-adjusted ROA in t+1.  
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 Panel B presents significant negative coefficients on aggregate Suspect which 
measures the total level of REM in the subsequent three periods. This indicates that 
REM firms overall have worse performance not only in period t+1, but also in period 
t+2 and period t+3. The negative effect of REM on firm performance lasts at least three 
periods.  
5.2 Test H2 
Table 8 presents results from testing H2. H2 predicts that the relation between 
REM and future firm performance increases with managerial ability. I use the residual 
from managerial ability estimation model (Equation 4) to proxy for managerial ability. 
Consistent with H1, the coefficients on Suspect are significantly negative for Production 
Suspect and Aggregate Suspect. This indicates that production REM firms perform 
worse than non-production REM firms. Consistent with prior literature, managerial 
ability is positively related to future firm performance. This is consistent with the 
intuition that more able managers are associated with better future firm performance. As 
predicted, I find a significantly positive relation between the interaction term (Suspect x 
Managerial Ability) and the subsequent firm performance. This indicates that better 
managers decrease the negative effect of REM, which supports H2. The coefficients on 
control variables are significant in the predicted direction.  
5.3 Supplemental Analyses 
Discretionary Expenses 
  In H1 test, following prior literature on REM, I sum up all three types of 
discretionary expenses (SG&A expense, R&D expense and advertising expense) in one 
variable which is called Discretionary Expenses. And I test whether the firms that 
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engaging in cutting discretionary expenses in general perform better or worse than other 
firms. Table 9A presents results for this test. I find that, in general, firms engaging in 
cutting discretionary expenses perform significantly better than other firms. I also notice 
that these three types of discretionary expenses are very different in nature, so I rerun 
the estimation model for each type of discretionary expense separately to get SG&A 
suspect, R&D suspect and advertising suspect. And then I test these three suspects 
separately in H1 and H2 testing. I find a significantly positive coefficient only on 
SG&A suspect in H1 testing. This indicates that firms that engaging in cutting SG&A 
discretionary expenses perform significantly better than other firms. And there is no 
significant difference on the subsequent firm performance between R&D suspect and 
other firms, and between advertising suspect and other firms. 
Pre- and Post- Sarbanes-Oxley Periods 
 Cohen et al. (2008) documents that the level of REM declined prior to SOX and 
increased significantly after SOX. And they suggest that managers switch from using 
accrual management to REM since SOX. So it is possible that REM has more negative 
effect in post-SOX period than in pre-SOX period. Here I test whether the relation 
between REM and future firm performance changed since the passage of SOX. Table 
10 presents results of this test. I find significantly negative coefficients on both 
production suspect and aggregate suspect in both pre- and post – SOX periods, which 
are consistent with H1. This suggests that production REM firms perform worse in the 
subsequent period than non-production REM firms no matter whether in the pre- or 
post- SOX periods. I find that in pre-SOX period, production REM firms have lower 
future firm performance of 1.185% than non-production REM firms. And in post-SOX 
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period, production REM firms have lower future firm performance of 1.604% than non-
production REM firms. And I do not find significant difference of subsequent firm 
performance between discretionary expense REM firms and others. When I test the 
relation between managerial ability and REM in the pre- and post- SOX periods, I find 
that more able managers reduce the negative effect of production REM in both pre- and 
post- SOX periods, which is consistent with my H2 test results. 
Mature versus Growth Firms 
 In this section, I provide tests to explore how the relation between managerial 
ability and REM varies in the mature firms and growth firms groups. Table 11 presents 
results of this test. First, I find significantly negative coefficients on production suspect 
in both mature firms group and growth firms group. This suggests that, no matter in the 
mature firms group or the growth firms group, production REM firms perform worse in 
the subsequent period than non-production REM firms. In addition, I find a significantly 
positive coefficient on discretionary expense suspect only in the mature firms group, but 
not in the growth firms group. And I only find a significantly negative coefficient on 
aggregate REM suspect in the growth firms group not in the mature firms group. 
Second, I find that only in the growth firms group, better managers are able to reduce 
the negative effect of overproduction. 
Firm Size 
 In this section, I provide tests to explore how the relation between managerial 
ability and REM varies across different firm size groups (large firms group, medium 
firms group and small firms group). Table 12 provides results of this test. I find that 
production REM firms perform worse than non-production REM firms in the 
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subsequent period in all three groups of firms. The discretionary expense REM firms 
perform better than others only in the small and medium firms groups. And the 
aggregate REM firms perform worse than other firms only in the small firms group. 
Furthermore, I find that more able managers are able to reduce the negative effect of 
overproduction in all three groups of firms. 
Manufacturing Firms 
 In this section, I test my two research questions with manufacturing firms only. 
Table 13 presents results of this test. I find results that are consistent with my prior 
results in H1 and H2 tests. I find that production REM firms perform worse than non-
production REM firms and discretionary expense REM firms perform better than non-
discretionary expense REM firms. Further, I find that better managers are able to 
mitigate the negative effect of overproduction. 
Young versus Old Firms 
 Here I test my two hypotheses in young firms group and old firms group 
separately. Table 14 provides results of this test. I find that production REM firms and 
aggregate REM firms perform worse than other firms only in the young firms group. 
And discretionary expense REM firms perform better than non-discretionary expense 
REM firms only in the young firms group as well. In the young firms group, more able 
managers are able to reduce the negative effect of overproduction. 
Bloated Balance Sheet 
 Zang (2012) suggests firms with bloated balance sheet are more likely to use 
REM instead of accrual management. Here I test whether the relation between REM 
and managerial ability varies across bloated balance sheet firms group and not bloated 
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balance sheet firms group. Table 15 presents the results of this test. I find that 
production REM firms perform worse in the subsequent period than non-production 
REM firms in both bloated group and not bloated group. And I find that aggregate REM 
firms perform worse than others only in the bloated balance sheet group. I also find that 
better managers can not reduce the negative effect of overproduction in the bloated 
balance sheet group. 
Analysts Following 
  In this section, I explore whether analysts’ following plays a role in the relation 
between managerial ability and REM. Table 16 presents results of this test. I find that 
production REM firms perform worse in the subsequent period than non-production 
REM firms in both analyst following group and no analyst following groups. The 
discretionary expense REM firms perform better than non-discretionary expense REM 
firms only in the no analyst following group. Furthermore, I find that more able 
managers are able to reduce the negative effect of overproduction only in the no analyst 
following group. 
Corporate Governance 
 To capture future firm performance beyond managerial ability, I include Gindex 
in addition to the other control variables in this test. I also include the interaction of 
Gindex and suspect. Table 17 presents results of this test. Consistent with the results in 
my H2 test, I find that more able managers are able to reduce the negative effect of 
overproduction. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
In this study, I examine the impact of REM on future firm performance. REM 
here refers to abnormal operating activities to barely meet an earnings benchmark. I use 
three measures of REM in my tests: (1) abnormally high production costs for a given 
sales level indicating excess overproduction, (2) abnormally low discretionary expense 
indicating excess cut of discretionary expense, and (3) the total level of abnormal 
operating activities which is the sum of the first two measures. First, I examine the 
relation between REM and future firm performance. I find that firms engaging in 
production REM have significantly lower subsequent industry-adjusted ROA than do 
other firms. This is also true for aggregate REM. The negative effect of aggregate REM 
on firm performance lasts for at least three subsequent periods. This result suggests that 
firms engage in production REM opportunistically. I also find a positive relation 
between cutting discretionary expenses, especially SG&A expenses, and future firm 
performance. This suggests that in general managers cut discretionary expenses 
efficiently or for a good reason. Second, my results show that the impact of REM on 
future firm performance varies cross-sectionally with managerial ability. I find that 
managerial ability decreases these negative effects of REM. 
My study makes the following contributions. First, my study provides the first 
evidence on the cross-sectional variation of the impact of REM on future firm 
performance. This evidence helps explain the mixed findings in the prior literature 
regarding to the impact of REM. Second, my study investigates the impact of REM in a 
general setting which test the future performance of REM firms versus all other firms. 
In addition, my study does not depend on a specific corporate event, a specific industry, 
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or a specific time period. The results of my study present a more complete picture of the 
impact of REM. Third, my study benefits investors by facilitating their understanding of 
the implications of REM on future firm performance. It also benefits managers by 
helping them learn the possible negative impact of REM.  
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Appendix A: Figures 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
REM
Opportunism
Costly behavior to mask true 
economic performance
Impact on future 
performance:
Negative
Efficiency/Signaling
Disclose private 
information/Enhance efficiency
Impact on future 
performance:
Positive
H1
H1
Figure 4 – H2
More Able Managers
• More knowledge about their firm
• More knowledge about industry
• Better able to see how decisions 
affect operating performance
Mgr. Ability
Mitigates the 
negative effect
Mgr. Ability
Enhances the 
positive effect
H2
H2
  
51 
Appendix B: Tables 
Table 1 Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Description Definition
Prod Suspect Real earnings 
management 
relating to 
production
An indicator variable that is equal to one if the residual from production 
estimation model 1 is in the highest quintile, zero otherwise
Disx Suspect Real earnings 
management 
relating to 
discretionary 
expense
An indicator variable that is equal to one if the -1 × residual from discretionary 
expense estimation model 2 is in the highest quintile, zero otherwise
Agg Suspect Aggregate measure 
of real earnings 
management
An indicator variable that is equal to one if the sum of the residual from 
production estimation model 1 and the -1 × residual from discretionary 
expense estimation model 2 is in the highest quintile, zero otherwise
MgrlAbility Managerial Ability The residual from managerial ability estimation model 4
HighAbility High Ability An indicator variabe that is equal to one if the decile rank (by indusy and year) 
of managerial ability score from model 4 is the top three deciles, zero 
otherwise
AdjROAt+1, t+2, t+3 Future Earnings The difference between firm-specific future ROA and the median ROA for 
the same year and industry (Fama and French 48 industry); ROA is calculated 
as earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total assets reported at the 
beginning of year t
Size Firm Size The natural log of the firm's total assets (AT) reported at the end of year t
Growth MTB The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity
Financial Health Modified Altman's 
Z-score
3.3 × (Net Incomet/Assetst-1) + 1.0 × (Salest/Assetst-1) +  1.4 × (Retained 
Earningst/Assetst-1) +  1.2 × (Working Capitalt/Assetst-1) 
Current 
Performance
AdjROA The difference between firm-specific ROA and the median ROA for the 
same year and industry (Fama and French 48 industry)
Prod Production Cost The sum of COGS and the change in inventory between t-1 and t
Disx Discretionary 
Expense
The sum of R&D, Advertising and Selling, General and Administrative 
expenses; as long as SG&A is available, R&D and advertising are set to zero 
if they are missing
COGS Cost of Goods Sold Cost of Goods Sold is measured over year t
SG&A Selling, General and Administrative ExpenseSG&A expense - current year operating lease expense - current year R&D 
expense
PP&E Property, Plant and 
Equipment
Net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of year t
OpsLease Operating Lease The discounted present value of the next five years of required operating lease 
payments (MRC1 - MRC5)
Future Performance Measures:
Other Variables:
Control Variables:
Real Earning Management Measures:
Ability Measures:
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Table 1 (cont’d): 
 
  
R&D Capitalized 
Research and 
Development 
expense
The five-year capitalization of R&D expense, where the net value (net of 
amortization) is 
Goodwill Goodwill Goodwill is measured at the beginning of year t
OtherIntan Other Intangible 
Assets
The difference between INTAN and GDWL measured at the beginning of 
year t
Firm Efficiency Firm Efficiency 
Score
Firm efficiency score estimated from Data Envelopment Analysis in Model 3
Market Share Market Share The percentage of revenues (SALE) earned by the firm within its Fama-
French industry in year t
Free Cash Flow 
Indicator
An indicator 
variable signifying 
positive free cash 
flows
An indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm has non-negative free cash 
flow (defined as earnings before depreciation and amortization (OIBDP) less 
the change in working capital (RECT+INVT+ACO-LCO-AP) less capital 
expenditures (CAPX) in year t), zero otherwise
Age Firm Age The number of years the firm has been listed on Compustat at the end of year 
t
Foreign Currency 
Indicator
An indicator 
variable signifying 
foreign operatings
An indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm reports a non-zero value for 
Foreign Currency Adjustment (FCA) in year t
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Table 2 Sample Selection 
  
Compustat Database (January 1987 - December 2008) 245,662
Less firm-years in financial industry (SIC 6000-7000) and utility industry (SIC 4400-5000) -77,716 167,946
Less firm-years with insufficient data to calculate firm efficiency score using model 3 -35,639 132,307
Less firm-years that missing industry classification -512 131,795
Less firm-years with insufficient data to calculate managerial ability using model 4 -82 131,713
Less firm-years with insufficient data to calculate REM measures using model 1 and 2 -14,133 117,580
Require at least 15 observations for each industry-year grouping -860 116,720
Less firm-years with insufficient data to test main hypothesis using model 5 and 6 -33,881 82,839
Final Sample 82,839
Notes: The sample selection procedures are dicussed in detail in section 4. The final sample consists of 82,839 firm-year observations from 
1987-2008, including 40 industries, 830 industry-years and 10,043 individual firms in the final sample. First, the sample period starts from 1987 
because I require that cash flow from operations be available from the Statement of Cash Flow on Compustat. And the period ends in 2008 
because the measure of future firm performance requires three years of subsequent earnings. Second, I eliminate financial and utilities 
industries from my sample because firms in these highly regulated industries follow accounting rules that differ from other industries. Third, 
since I get my abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expense by testing the estimation models for every industry-year, I want 
to have a big enough industry-year grouping. So I require at least 15 observations for each industry-year group. Finally, I impose all the data-
availability requirements.
54 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
  
N Mean Median Std      
MgrlAbility 82,839 -0.0370 -0.0434 0.1794
Production Costs Residual 82,839 -0.4969 -0.5278 0.4693
Discretionary Expense Residual 82,839 0.1210 0.2265 0.6040
Aggregate Residual 82,839 -0.3759 -0.2583 0.7105
adjROAt+1 82,839 0.0000 0.0293 0.1427
adjROAt+2 82,839 0.0000 0.0302 0.1417
adjROAt+3 82,839 0.0000 0.0320 0.1439
Current Performance 82,839 0.0000 0.0295 0.1478
Size 82,839 4.7695 4.6778 2.3020
Growth 82,839 2.8580 1.8584 5.3441
Financial Health 82,839 0.2621 1.7328 6.4944
Final Sample
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the final sample. Please see Table 1 for variable descriptions. 
Details of the sample selection procedure for the final sample are provided in Table 2. All variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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Table 4 Univariate Correlations 
  
MarlAbility Abnormal 
Prod
Abnormal 
Disx
aggregate 
REM
adjROAt+1 adjROAt+2 adjROAt+3 Current 
Performance
Size Growth
-0.13681
<.0001
0.06117 -0.14169
<.0001 <.0001
-0.03836 0.54011 0.75657
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.27336 -0.15445 0.22791 0.09174
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.23083 -0.133 0.21326 0.09345 0.68338
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.20409 -0.11859 0.20264 0.09394 0.58048 0.68411
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.3375 -0.18354 0.25894 0.0989 0.69353 0.58208 0.52469
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.10915 -0.13087 0.32487 0.18974 0.34013 0.32886 0.32863 0.36584
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.01284 -0.00319 -0.214 -0.18404 0.0528 0.02948 0.01676 0.04799 -0.00197
<.0001 0.3583 <.0001 <.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <.0001 0.5715
0.42785 -0.277 0.30807 0.07894 0.55292 0.48072 0.44092 0.7039 0.38891 -0.06509
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Notes: Please see Table 1 for variable definitions. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels.
Financial 
Health
Current 
Performance
Size
Growth
Abnormal 
Prod
Abnormal 
Disx
aggregate 
REM
adjROAt+1
adjROAt+3
adjROAt+2
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Table 5 Real Earnings Management Model Parameters 
  
Exp. Sign
Intercept -0.0487 *** 0.2476 ***
(-8.8900) (26.2400)
1/At-1 0.0000 0.0000 ***
(-1.6300) (-15.3700)
Salest/At-1 + 0.7337 ***
(129.6300)
Salest-1/At-1 + 0.1465 ***
(19.3900)
∆Salest/At-1 + 0.0364 ***
(4.3700)
∆Salest-1/At-1 − -0.0077
(-0.4000)
No. of industry-year
Adj. R square
Notes: This table reports the estimated parameters for the REM estimation models, including 
production REM estimation model and discretionary expense REM estimation model. The 
residuals from estimations are the abnormal operating activitivies that are used to classify REM 
suspects. The regressions are estimated for every industry-year. Fama and French industry 
classification is used to define industries. Industry-years that have less than 15 observations are 
excluded from the sample. There are 830 seperate industry-years over 1987 - 2008. The table 
reports the mean coefficient across all industry-years and t-statistics are calculated using the 
standard error of the mean across the industry-years. The table also reports the mean adjusted 
R square (across industry-years) for each of these regressions. Please see Table 1 for variable 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Production Costs Discretionary Exp.
830
79.30%
830
14.06%
Dependent Variable = 
    𝑖 
      𝑖 , −1
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1
      𝑖 , −1
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     𝑖 
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Table 6 Managerial Ability Model Parameters 
  
Exp. Sign
Size + 0.0303 ***
(5.8100)
Market Share + 2.4788 ***
(2.1729)
Free Cash Flow Indicator + 0.0818 ***
(8.4700)
Age + -0.0024
(-0.9900)
Foreign Currency Indicator − -0.0011
(-0.1000)
Intercept + 0.5528 ***
(11.8700)
Year Fixed Effects
Industry Estimations
Notes: This table the averages from the Tobit estimations of Model 4 by industry. The residual from 
the estimation is Managerial Ability. The dependent variable of this regression is the Firm Efficiency 
calculated from Data Envelopment Analysis; the independent variables are five firm characteristics 
that affect the firm efficiency. For illustrative purpose, I present the average of the industry 
coefficients and the Fama-MacBeth t-statistic based on the standard error of these coefficients (in 
parantheses). Please see Table 1 for variable definitions.
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Included
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Dependent Variable = Firm Efficiency
Average Coefficient (Fama-
MacBeth t-statistic)
Firm Efficiency = β0 +β1Ln(Total Assets) +β2Market Share +β3Positive Free Cash Flow 
+β4Ln(Age) +β5BusinessSegmentConcentration +β6Foreign Currency Indicator +Year 
Indicators + є 
(4) 
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Table 7 H1 Testing 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.013 *** 0.0026 ** -0.0040 ***
(-11.85) (2.30) (-4.76)
Current Performance + 0.4983 *** 0.5049 *** 0.5032 ***
(127.15) (130.12) (129.12)
Size + 0.0073 *** 0.0073 *** 0.0073 ***
(33.98) (33.76) (34.18)
Growth + 0.0016 *** 0.0017 *** 0.0016 ***
(8.21) (8.68) (8.11)
Financial Health + 0.0125 *** 0.0122 *** 0.0123 ***
(42.99) (42.12) (42.41)
Intercept − -0.048 *** -0.0500 *** -0.0490 ***
(-8.18) (-8.44) (-8.34)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-sq 0.5027 0.5019 0.502
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and 
controls. The dependent variable future performance is measured as ROA t+1. I run this regression for three types 
of suspects seperately, including production costs suspects, discretionary expense suspects and aggregate 
suspests. All three types of suspects are defined in Table 1. Please also see Table 1 for the other variable 
definitions.
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
Panel A: Test H1 using Three Types of Suspects in period t+1
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 7 (cont’d): 
  
Exp. Sign
Agg Suspect ? -0.0040 *** -0.00453 *** -0.00485 ***
(-4.76) (-4.43) (-4.48)
Current Performance + 0.5032 *** 0.37288 *** 0.31648 ***
(129.12) (85.58) (68.53)
Size + 0.0073 *** 0.01025 *** 0.01261 ***
(34.18) (42.71) (49.57)
Growth + 0.0016 *** -0.00000048 -0.00094237 *
(8.11) -0.02 (-4.00)
Financial Health + 0.0123 *** 0.01287 *** 0.0127 ***
(42.41) (39.61) (36.88)
Intercept − -0.0490 *** -0.05928 *** -0.06714 ***
(-8.34) (-8.97) (-9.59)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-sq 0.502 0.3688 0.3121
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and 
controls. I run this regression for aggregate suspects and test the effect of aggregate REM on firm performance 
in period t+1, t+2, and t+3. Please also see Table 1 for the other variable definitions.
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Panel B: Test H1 using Future Firm Performance in period t+1, t+2, and t+3
adjROAt+1 adjROAt+2 adjROAt+3
Dependent Variable = 
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 8 H2 Testing 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect − -0.0120 *** 0.0019 -0.004 ***
(-10.57) (1.63) (-4.47)
MgrlAbility + 0.0256 *** 0.0385 *** 0.0291 ***
(7.76) (11.62) (9.16)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + 0.0359 *** -0.0140 * 0.0286 ***
(6.23) (-1.83) (4.70)
Current Performance + 0.4935 *** 0.5003 *** 0.4982 ***
(125.43) (128.39) (127.30)
Size + 0.0075 *** 0.0075 *** 0.0076 ***
(34.77) (36.64) (35.20)
Growth + 0.0016 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0016 ***
(8.23) (8.22) (7.83)
Financial Health + 0.0117 *** 0.0115 *** 0.0116 ***
(39.48) (38.96) (38.99)
Intercept − -0.045 *** -0.0460 *** -0.0460 ***
(-7.63) (-7.76) (-7.71)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-sq 0.5039 0.5028 0.503
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects, managerial 
ability and controls. Managerial Ability is a continuous score get as the residual from managerial estimation Model 
4. I run this regression for three types of suspects seperately, including production costs suspects, discretionary 
expense suspects and aggregate suspests. All three types of suspects are defined in Table 1. Please also see 
Table 1 for the other variable definitions.
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
Test H2 using a continuous managerial ability score MgrlAbility
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + β3*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-
1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
(6) 
 
61 
Table 9 Testing Three Types of Discretionary Expenses 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? 0.00525 *** -0.00222 0.0018
(5.11) (-0.84) (0.42)
Current Performance + 0.50147 *** 0.49711 *** 0.50711 ***
(130.44) (109.38) (78.63)
Size + 0.0073 *** 0.00905 *** 0.00672 ***
(36.23) (27.93) (18.98)
Growth + 0.00214 *** 0.0007 *** 0.00314 ***
(11.24) (2.79) (10.12)
Financial Health + 0.01016 *** 0.0134 *** 0.00957 ***
(35.71) (36.53) (19.68)
Intercept − -0.04856 *** -0.0187 *** -0.0210 ***
(-8.94) (-3.54) (-3.3)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-sq 0.4771 0.5544 0.5004
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel A: Test H1 using Three Types of Discretionary Expenses in period t+1
SGA Suspect R&D Suspect Adv Suspect
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and controls. The 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 9 (cont’d): 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? 0.0027 ** -0.00134 0.00307
(2.22) (-0.49) (1.36)
MgrlAbility + 0.000089 0.0623 *** 0.0349 ***
(0.03) (13.46) (6.13)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + 0.02161 *** 0.0076 0.0293 **
(2.70) (0.68) (2.14)
Current Performance + 0.30552 *** 0.48771 *** 0.50106 ***
(67.04) (106.44) (77.20)
Size + 0.0126 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0072 ***
(52.72) (29.62) (19.98)
Growth + -0.000835 *** 0.0005 ** 0.00296 ***
(-3.70) (2.00) (9.54)
Financial Health + 0.0099 *** 0.01251 *** 0.00894 ***
(28.69) (33.69) (18.09)
Intercept − -0.0644 *** -0.0152 *** -0.0191 ***
(-10.01) (-2.89) (-3)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-sq 0.2768 0.5562 0.5015
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects, managerial 
ability and controls. High Ability is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the decile rank (by industry and year) of 
managerial ability score is the top three deciles, and zero otherwise. I run this regression for three types of suspects 
seperately, including production costs suspects, discretionary expense suspects and aggregate suspests. All three types 
of suspects are defined in Table 1. Please also see Table 1 for the other variable definitions.
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
SGA Suspect R&D Suspect Adv Suspect
Panel B: Test H2 using Three Types of Discretionary Expenses in period t+1
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*HighAbilityt-1 + β3*Suspectt*HighAbilityt-
1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
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Table 10 Testing across Years 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.0119 *** -0.01604 *** 0.00192 0.00288 -0.0043 *** -0.0060 ***
(-8.5) (-8.64) (1.38) (1.44) (-3.82) (-3.78)
Current Performance + 0.47326 *** 0.5252 *** 0.47875 *** 0.53516 *** 0.47712 *** 0.53214 ***
(94.62) (81.01) (96.48) (83.70) (95.77) (82.69)
Size + 0.00666 *** 0.00838 *** 0.00662 *** 0.00849 *** 0.00668 *** 0.00851 ***
(25.39) (22.32) (25.09) (22.58) (25.46) (22.67)
Growth + 0.00087 *** 0.00331 *** 0.00094 *** 0.00344 *** 0.00084 *** 0.0033 ***
(3.58) (9.56) (3.86) (9.91) (3.46) (9.50)
Financial Health + 0.01357 *** 0.01192 *** 0.01339 *** 0.01134 *** 0.01348 *** 0.01164 ***
(36.11) (24.93) (35.66) (23.77) (35.82) (24.30)
Intercept − -0.0445 *** -0.05165 *** -0.0458 *** -0.0544 *** -0.0452 *** -0.0530 ***
(-6.26) (-5.22) (-6.44) (-5.5) (-6.36) (-5.35)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agg SuspectDisx SuspectProd Suspect
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and controls. The dependent 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Pre-2002 Post-2002 Pre-2002 Post-2002 Pre-2002 Post-2002
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel A: Test H1 using two subsamples pre-SOX sample and post-SOX sample
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 10 (cont’d): 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.01171 *** -0.0135 *** 0.00123 0.00178 -0.0050 *** -0.0049 ***
(-8.21) (-6.97) (0.88) (0.89) (-4.28) (-2.93)
MgrlAbility + 0.0364 *** 0.0170 *** 0.0436 *** 0.0324 *** 0.0387 *** 0.0234 ***
(8.77) (3.08) (11.27) (6.28) (9.74) (4.37)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + 0.02272 *** 0.05447 *** -0.0174 * -0.02 0.01854 ** 0.03577 ***
(3.17) (5.56) (-1.85) (-1.39) (2.42) (3.54)
Current Performance + 0.46719 *** 0.52055 *** 0.47278 *** 0.5306 *** 0.47079 *** 0.52747 ***
(92.99) (79.94) (94.86) (82.49) (94.07) (81.56)
Size + 0.00682 *** 0.00869 *** 0.00679 *** 0.00882 *** 0.00688 *** 0.00887 ***
(25.96) (22.95) (25.65) (23.20) (26.18) (23.39)
Growth + 0.000798 *** 0.00342 *** 0.00082 *** 0.0034 *** 0.000723 *** 0.00332 ***
(3.28) (9.87) (3.36) (9.77) (2.97) (9.55)
Financial Health + 0.01263 *** 0.01123 *** 0.01254 *** 0.01083 *** 0.01257 *** 0.01096 ***
(32.97) (23.12) (32.76) (22.33) (32.78) (22.49)
Intercept − -0.03967 *** -0.0501 *** -0.0405 *** -0.0515 *** -0.0401 *** -0.0505 ***
(-5.58) (-5.07) (-5.68) (-5.2) (-5.64) (-5.09)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-2002 Pre-2002 Post-2002
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Pre-2002 Post-2002 Pre-2002
Panel B: Test H2 using two subsamples pre-SOX sample and post-SOX sample
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + β3*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-
1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
(6) 
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Table 11 Testing across Different Growth Firms 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.01131 *** -0.01855 *** 0.00533 ** 0.00152 0.0008 -0.0094 ***
(-5.17) (-9.15) (2.53) (0.58) (0.49) (-4.9)
Current Performance + 0.42935 *** 0.52185 *** 0.43319 *** 0.53153 *** 0.43431 *** 0.52807 ***
(57.38) (75.89) (58.24) (78.10) (58.31) (77.21)
Size + 0.00482 *** 0.01142 *** 0.00469 *** 0.0115 *** 0.00481 *** 0.01148 ***
(10.96) (26.25) (10.59) (26.34) (10.92) (26.36)
Growth + 0.00798 ** 0.00089 0.00851 *** 0.00091 0.00834 *** 0.00076
(2.48) (1.61) (2.64) (1.63) (2.59) (1.36)
Financial Health + 0.01128 *** 0.01299 *** 0.01104 *** 0.0127 *** 0.01104 *** 0.01285 ***
(20.41) (24.27) (20.03) (23.72) (19.92) (23.98)
Intercept − -0.04461 *** -0.06348 *** -0.0456 *** -0.066 *** -0.0462 *** -0.0638 ***
(-4.5) (-4.53) (-4.6) (-4.7) (-4.66) (-4.54)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and controls. The 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
mature growth mature growth mature growth
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel A: Test H1 using two subsamples mature firms sample and growth firms sample
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 11 (cont’d): 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.01161 *** -0.01444 *** 0.00541 ** 0.0012 0.0014 -0.0074 ***
(-5.13) (-6.69) (2.52) (0.46) (0.78) (-3.65)
MgrlAbility + 0.01926 *** 0.0285 *** 0.0153 ** 0.0465 *** 0.0124 ** 0.0373 ***
(2.97) (4.63) (2.54) (8.20) (1.98) (6.38)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + 0.00629 0.05039 *** 0.0164 -0.03 * 0.02649 ** 0.03808 ***
(0.56) (4.78) (1.22) (-1.8) (2.24) (3.36)
Current Performance + 0.42706 *** 0.51554 *** 0.43161 *** 0.52474 *** 0.43226 *** 0.52097 ***
(56.87) (74.62) (57.87) (76.63) (57.86) (75.73)
Size + 0.00492 *** 0.01185 *** 0.00483 *** 0.01189 *** 0.00491 *** 0.01187 ***
(11.14) (27.09) (10.87) (27.05) (11.13) (27.11)
Growth + 0.00847 *** 0.00075 0.0088 *** 0.00067 0.0088 *** 0.0006
(2.63) (1.35) (2.73) (1.20) (2.73) (1.08)
Financial Health + 0.01092 *** 0.012 *** 0.01072 *** 0.01179 *** 0.01066 *** 0.01185 ***
(19.49) (21.94) (19.17) (21.56) (18.98) (21.65)
Intercept − -0.04182 *** -0.06325 *** -0.0437 *** -0.06305 *** -0.0441 *** -0.0618 ***
(-4.21) (-4.52) (-4.39) (-4.5) (-4.44) (-4.41)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
mature growth mature growth mature growth
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel B: Test H2 using two subsamples mature firms sample and growth firms sample
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + β3*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-
1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
(6) 
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Table 12 Testing across Different Size Firms 
  
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Exp. Sign Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
Suspect ? -0.01208 *** -0.0062 *** 0.00707 ** 0.0012 -0.0043 * -0.0017
(-5.28) (-3.99) (2.16) (1.03) (-1.94) (-1.57)
Current Performance + 0.48919 *** 0.45466 *** 0.494 *** 0.4585 *** 0.4935 *** 0.4571 ***
(68.11) (63.86) (69.39) (64.94) (68.18) (64.33)
Size + 0.0121 *** 0.00409 *** 0.01191 *** 0.004 *** 0.0121 *** 0.004 ***
(7.65) (6.43) (7.52) (6.31) (7.64) (6.34)
Growth + -0.0033 *** 0.00888 *** -0.0033 *** 0.004 *** -0.0033 *** 0.0089 ***
(-8.2) (31.27) (-8.08) (6.31) (-8.28) (31.17)
Financial Health + 0.01301 *** 0.0073 *** 0.01282 *** 0.007 *** 0.0129 *** 0.0071 ***
(23.38) (14.29) (23.04) (13.83) (23.20) (13.94)
Intercept − -0.03911 *** -0.0309 *** -0.0413 *** -0.0308 *** -0.0410 *** -0.0305 ***
(-2.82) (-3.67) (-2.97) (-3.65) (-2.95) (-3.61)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and controls. 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
small large small large small large
Panel A: Test H1 using three subsamples small firms, medium firms and large firms
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 12 (cont’d): 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.00849 *** -0.00656 *** 0.00578 * 0.00105 -0.0013 -0.0022 **
(-3.37) (-4.23) (1.76) (0.87) (-0.53) (-1.98)
MgrlAbility + 0.02756 *** 0.01521 *** 0.04079 *** 0.02087 *** 0.03039 *** 0.02206 ***
(3.65) (3.65) (6.06) (5.02) (4.23) (5.31)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + 0.04005 *** 0.03235 *** -0.0093 0.00151 0.04411 *** -0.00121
(3.18) (3.81) (-0.45) (0.18) (3.25) (-0.15)
Current Performance + 0.48303 *** 0.4523 *** 0.48705 *** 0.45657 *** 0.48663 *** 0.45478 ***
(66.51) (63.50) (67.61) (64.61) (67.45) (63.93)
Size + 0.01443 *** 0.00466 *** 0.01422 *** 0.00443 *** 0.01415 *** 0.00446 ***
(8.90) (7.28) (8.75) (6.92) (8.70) (6.98)
Growth + -0.00325 *** 0.00895 *** -0.00327 *** 0.00897 *** -0.00327 *** 0.00888 ***
(-8.09) (31.45) (-8.11) (31.48) (-8.13) (31.08)
Financial Health + 0.01243 *** 0.00658 *** 0.01234 *** 0.00629 *** 0.01231 *** 0.00644 ***
(22.11) (12.53) (21.96) (12.06) (21.88) (12.24)
Intercept − -0.04061 *** -0.03079 *** -0.0407 *** -0.02904 *** -0.0413 *** -0.0285 ***
(-2.92) (-3.65) (-2.94) (-3.44) (-2.97) (-3.38)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agg Suspect
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
large
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and controls. The 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
small large small large small
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect
Panel B: Test H2 using three subsamples small firms, medium firms and large firms
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + β3*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-
1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
(6) 
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Table 13 Testing with manufacturing firms only 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.01499 *** 0.00245 * -0.0065 ***
(-9.8) (1.82) (-5.8)
Current Performance + 0.50376 *** 0.5098 *** 0.50765 ***
(93.17) (94.83) (94.22)
Size + 0.00681 *** 0.00682 *** 0.00688 ***
(24.98) (24.90) (25.22)
Growth + 0.00141 *** 0.00146 *** 0.00128 ***
(5.40) (5.58) (4.91)
Financial Health + 0.01423 *** 0.01403 *** 0.01416 ***
(35.15) (34.67) (34.94)
Intercept − -0.07147 *** -0.0744 *** -0.0721 ***
(-11.36) (-11.68) (-11.45)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel A: Test H1 using a subsample of manufacturing firms in period t+1
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 13 (cont’d): 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect − -0.0117 *** 0.00115 -0.00662 ***
(-7.36) (0.85) (-5.67)
MgrlAbility + 0.03867 *** 0.0613 *** 0.0495 ***
(8.83) (14.50) (11.48)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + 0.05858 *** -0.0410 *** 0.02569 ***
(7.72) (-4.46) (3.41)
Current Performance + 0.49173 *** 0.49759 *** 0.4956 ***
(90.16) (91.66) (91.09)
Size + 0.0074 *** 0.0074 *** 0.0075 ***
(26.87) (26.81) (27.26)
Growth + 0.00149 *** 0.0014 *** 0.00122 ***
(5.71) (5.35) (4.68)
Financial Health + 0.0132 *** 0.01303 *** 0.01308 ***
(32.06) (31.74) (31.84)
Intercept − -0.07196 *** -0.0746 *** -0.0720 ***
(-11.47) (-11.72) (-11.46)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel B: Test H2 using a subsample of manufacturing firms
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + β3*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-
1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
(6) 
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Table 14 Testing across Different Age Firms 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.0191 *** -0.00297 0.00442 ** 0.00043 -0.0065 *** -0.0017
(-10.34) (-1.56) (1.98) (0.31) (-3.95) (-1.27)
Current Performance + 0.48059 *** 0.46286 *** 0.49065 *** 0.46384 *** 0.48831 *** 0.46302 ***
(74.83) (54.16) (77.20) (54.42) (76.47) (54.16)
Size + 0.00939 *** 0.00336 *** 0.00938 *** 0.00337 *** 0.00952 *** 0.00337 ***
(22.22) (10.20) (22.01) (10.22) (22.48) (10.24)
Growth + 0.00073 ** 0.00722 *** 0.00085 *** 0.00725 *** 0.00073 ** 0.00718 ***
(2.29) (18.98) (2.64) (18.95) (2.27) (18.78)
Financial Health + 0.01261 *** 0.00973 *** 0.01223 *** 0.00967 *** 0.01241 *** 0.00974 ***
(25.31) (17.94) (24.57) (17.87) (24.85) (17.91)
Intercept − -0.0553 *** -0.03119 *** -0.0571 *** -0.0318 *** -0.0566 *** -0.0315 ***
(-5.66) (-3.89) (-5.83) (-3.97) (-5.79) (-3.93)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel A: Test H1 using two subsamples young firms and old firms
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and controls. The 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
young old young old young old
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 14 (cont’d): 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.0172 *** -0.00355 * 0.00334 0.00044 -0.0060 *** -0.0019
(-8.89) (-1.86) (1.50) (0.31) (-3.49) (-1.39)
MgrlAbility + 0.03493 *** 0.0183 *** 0.0442 *** 0.0127 ** 0.0393 *** 0.0126 **
(6.32) (3.27) (8.74) (2.30) (7.50) (2.28)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + 0.03263 *** -0.00479 -0.0086 0.01 0.02683 *** 0.01967 *
(3.46) (-0.45) (-0.6) (1.43) (2.64) (1.87)
Current Performance + 0.47536 *** 0.4606 *** 0.48502 *** 0.46194 *** 0.48244 *** 0.4609 ***
(73.74) (53.75) (76.01) (54.09) (75.26) (53.78)
Size + 0.00963 *** 0.00352 *** 0.00965 *** 0.00356 *** 0.00978 *** 0.00355 ***
(22.75) (10.59) (22.61) (10.66) (23.06) (10.68)
Growth + 0.00064 ** 0.00724 *** 0.00067 ** 0.00726 *** 0.0006 * 0.00722 ***
(2.00) (19.00) (2.09) (18.97) (1.86) (18.88)
Financial Health + 0.01223 *** 0.00926 *** 0.01134 *** 0.08932 *** 0.01141 *** 0.00924 ***
(24.57) (16.57) (22.35) (22.33) (22.42) (16.49)
Intercept − -0.0571 *** -0.02872 *** -0.0530 *** -0.0301 *** -0.0527 *** -0.0289 ***
(-5.83) (-3.57) (-5.42) (-3.74) (-5.39) (-3.6)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel B: Test H2 using two subsamples young firms and old firms
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
young old young old young old
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + β3*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-
1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
(6) 
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Table 15 Testing across Different Accrual Constraints 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.1083 *** -0.36107 ** 0.03134 -0.14508 -0.0444 * -0.0584
(-3.6) (-1.96) (0.98) (0.76) (-1.76) (-0.38)
Current Performance + 0.2419 *** 0.0156 *** 0.24394 *** 0.01564 *** 0.24359 *** 0.0157 ***
(35.74) (4.04) (36.17) (4.05) (36.10) (4.05)
Size + 0.1043 *** 0.20822 *** 0.10519 *** 0.20419 *** 0.10542 *** 0.2084 ***
(25.99) (6.50) (26.12) (6.33) (26.36) (6.48)
Growth + 0.00023 0.00017 0.00024 0.00019 0.00023 0.0002
(1.35) (0.26) (1.38) (0.29) (1.37) (0.29)
Financial Health + 0.00832 *** -0.00045 * 0.00833 *** -0.00044 * 0.00832 *** -0.0004 *
(35.12) (-1.76) (35.20) (-1.71) (35.14) (-1.71)
Intercept − -0.2859 * -0.88278 *** -0.3122 ** -0.90906 -0.3047 ** -0.9089
(-1.9) (-0.75) (-2.07) (-0.77) (-2.02) (-0.77)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel A: Test H1 using two subsamples bloated balance sheet firms and not bloated balance sheet firms
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and controls. 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
bloated not bloated bloated not bloated bloated not bloated
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 15 (cont’d): 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.1105 *** -0.3664 ** 0.0458 0.1285 -0.0137 *** -0.8960
(-2.86) (-1.98) (1.38) (0.65) (-0.44) (-0.76)
MgrlAbility + -0.2436 *** -0.1042 -0.2169 *** -0.1898 -0.2395 *** -0.2549
(-3.23) (-0.17) (-2.98) (-0.35) (-3.29) (-0.43)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + 0.09671 0.38993 0.2344 0.5960 0.3196 * 0.75324
(0.57) (0.37) (1.22) (0.41) (1.87) (0.68)
Current Performance + 0.24222 *** 0.0156 *** 0.2445 *** 0.0156 *** 0.2437 *** 0.01566 ***
(35.79) (4.04) (36.25) (4.04) (36.08) (4.05)
Size + 0.10519 *** 0.20767 *** 0.1061 *** 0.2051 *** 0.1059 *** 0.2081 ***
(26.16) (6.45) (26.27) (6.33) (26.37) (6.44)
Growth + 0.00024 0.00016 *** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.00018
(1.36) (0.26) (1.39) (0.30) (1.37) (0.28)
Financial Health + 0.00828 *** -0.0005 * 0.0083 *** -4E-04 * 0.0083 *** -0.0004 *
(34.90) (-1.76) (35.01) (-1.72) (35.01) (-1.72)
Intercept − -0.3078 ** -0.8828 -0.3342 ** -0.933 -0.3310 ** -0.8960
(-2.04) (-0.75) (-2.22) (-0.79) (-2.19) (-0.76)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Test H2 using two subsamples bloated balance sheet firms and not bloated balance sheet firms
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
bloated not bloated bloated not bloated bloated not bloated
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + β3*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-
1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
(6) 
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Table 16 Testing across Different Analyst Following Firms 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.01517 *** -0.01245 *** 0.00105 0.0056 *** -0.0064 *** -0.0020
(-9.49) (-7.86) (0.75) (3.25) (-5.21) (-1.51)
Current Performance + 0.51005 *** 0.48321 *** 0.51936 *** 0.4888 *** 0.51533 *** 0.48861 ***
(81.46) (93.16) (83.85) (95.21) (82.62) (94.87)
Size + 0.0071 *** 0.00662 *** 0.00704 *** 0.0065 *** 0.00707 *** 0.00663 ***
(21.63) (20.16) (21.34) (19.55) (21.52) (20.14)
Growth + 0.0055 *** -0.00108 *** 0.00564 *** -0.001 *** 0.00548 *** -0.0011 ***
(20.17) (-3.81) (20.59) (-3.52) (19.99) (-3.84)
Financial Health + 0.01143 *** 0.01298 *** 0.01093 *** 0.0127 *** 0.01122 *** 0.01279 ***
(24.64) (33.65) (23.68) (33.09) (24.15) (33.16)
Intercept − -0.05143 *** -0.04604 *** -0.0522 *** -0.046 *** -0.0517 *** -0.0464 ***
(-6.04) (-5.44) (-6.12) (-5.45) (-6.06) (-5.47)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Panel A: Test H1 using two subsamples with analyst followings and without analyst following
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM suspects and controls. 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
follow no follow follow no follow follow no follow
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 16 (cont’d): 
  
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.0162 *** -0.0117 *** 0.0001 0.00494 *** -0.0068 *** -0.0018
(-10.13) (-7.1) (0.07) (2.84) (-5.47) (-1.27)
MgrlAbility + 0.0494 *** 0.0248 *** 0.0505 *** 0.0318 *** 0.0413 *** 0.0263 ***
(12.11) (5.16) (11.64) (7.27) (9.52) (5.75)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + -0.0066 0.02174 *** -0.0218 ** -0.0130 0.04666 *** 0.01954 **
(-0.29) (2.68) (-2.18) (-1.18) (5.52) (2.27)
Current Performance + 0.50508 *** 0.47889 *** 0.51468 *** 0.48445 *** 0.50962 *** 0.48407 ***
(80.63) (91.76) (83.05) (93.79) (81.71) (93.42)
Size + 0.00729 *** 0.00678 *** 0.00718 *** 0.00665 *** 0.00722 *** 0.00682 ***
(22.21) (20.61) (21.76) (20.01) (21.98) (20.69)
Growth + 0.00537 *** -0.0011 *** 0.00553 -0.00107 *** 0.00542 *** -0.0011 ***
(19.70) (-3.86) (20.18) (-3.74) (19.74) (-3.97)
Financial Health + -0.0458 *** 0.01243 *** 0.00936 *** 0.01227 *** 0.00949 *** 0.01226 ***
(-5.37) (31.78) (19.47) (31.44) (19.69) (31.32)
Intercept − -0.3078 ** -0.0429 *** -0.0465 *** -0.04233 *** -0.0461 *** -0.0429 ***
(-2.04) (-5.06) (-5.45) (-4.99) (-5.41) (-5.05)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Test H2 using two subsamples with analyst followings and without analyst following
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
follow no follow follow no follow follow no follow
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + β3*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-
1+ βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
(6) 
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Table 17 Testing Firms with Governance Score 
  
Panel A: Test H1 including governance score from Risk Matrix
Exp. Sign
Suspect ? -0.00997 *** -0.00452 ** -0.0046 **
(-3.38) (-1.96) (-2.09)
Current Performance + 0.49874 *** 0.50328 *** 0.50064 ***
(36.13) (36.62) (36.26)
Size + 0.00435 *** 0.00433 *** 0.00427 ***
(5.05) (5.01) (4.96)
Growth + 0.0075 *** 0.00749 *** 0.00746 ***
(14.09) (14.00) (13.90)
Financial Health + 0.00821 *** 0.00789 *** 0.00811 ***
(8.56) (8.26) (8.43)
Intercept − -0.01925 -0.0185 -0.0186
(-0.92) (-0.89) (-0.89)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on 
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  (5) 
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Table 17 (cont’d): 
 
Panel B: Test H2 including Gindex
Exp. Sign
Suspect − -0.0182 ** -0.00892 -0.01038
(-2.24) (-1.35) (-1.33)
MgrlAbility + 0.01827 ** 0.0282 *** 0.0296 ***
(2.22) (3.48) (3.65)
Gindex − 0.0002 0.00021 0.000256
(0.63) (0.58) (0.77)
Suspect × MgrlAbility + 0.05613 *** 0.0025 0.00203
(3.33) (0.14) (0.12)
Suspect x Gindex − 0.0009 0.000447 0.00053
(1.08) (0.67) (0.65)
Current Performance + 0.49571 *** 0.50202 *** 0.49874 ***
(35.91) (34.46) (36.09)
Size + 0.0044 *** 0.0045 *** 0.0044 ***
(4.95) (5.02) (4.95)
Growth + 0.00768 *** 0.00744 *** 0.00739 ***
(14.34) (13.90) (13.75)
Financial Health + 0.0070 *** 0.00682 *** 0.00702 ***
(7.07) (6.86) (7.02)
Intercept − -0.01721 -0.0154 -0.0156
(-0.82) (-0.73) (-0.74)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results from the regression of future firm performance on REM 
*, **, *** denotes a two-tailed p-value of less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Dependent Variable = adjROAt+1
Prod Suspect Disx Suspect Agg Suspect
Future_Perft+i = β0 + β1*Suspectt + β2*MgrlAbilityt-1 + β3Gindext+ β4*Suspectt*MgrlAbilityt-1+ 
β5*Suspectt*Gindext+βn*Controlsnt + εt+i  
